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The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU does not currently meet the 
different needs of diverse agricultural conditions of different member countries in a 
just and equal way. To meet this challenge has become inevitably more difficult as 
new and diverse Central and Eastern European countries have entered the 
Community. Several commentators and economists have thus suggested that a 
renationalization of the CAP would be an applicable way to proceed in an attempt to 
pursue a policy sensitive enough to national and regional or local needs and 
priorities. Renationalization mainly deals with two issues: (i) should member states 
have more power and freedom on decisions of agricultural policy, and (ii) should 
there be a shift from common financing back to national funds? This paper 
discusses these issues from a political-economy perspective. 
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Introduction  
 
There is growing awareness within the political system that the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU is not the most efficient means of addressing an 
increasing number of policy objectives, ranging from rural development to 
environmental considerations. The CAP has hitherto sought to address a wide 
range of goals with a variety of uncoordinated instruments, leading to the uneven, 
non-targeted, unconditional and inefficient subsidizing of EU farmers. Farmers in 
the most-favored areas receive more than double the amount per hectare in CAP 
arable payments compared to farmers in the less favored areas of Finland and 
Portugal. Thus, for equity reasons there is a need for a better balanced distribution 
of CAP support among products, regions and farmers (Buckwell et al. 1997, 
Shucksmith et al. 2005). Furthermore, the logic of remunerating the 
multifunctional role of agriculture – a key concept in the EU today – calls for better 
consideration of factors like the rural territory, the environment, the landscape, 
rural communities and rural employment.  
 
Several commentators and economists have suggested that a renationalization of 
the CAP would be an applicable way to proceed in an attempt to pursue a policy 
sensitive enough to national and regional or local needs and priorities (Kjeldahl and 
Tracy 1994, Gant 1995, Rabinowicz et al. 2001). Renationalization implies a shift of 
competence back from EU institutions to national ones. This may be in terms of 
decision-making, of financing or of implementation, or all of these aspects. Is such 
additional flexibility desirable? Does it offer a way to relieve the hard-pressed EU 
budget? How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here? At what level is 
competence exercised in the most efficient way? What tasks could better be left to 
the Member States? And, vice versa, what missions would this produce for the 
union? How to ensure that a redefined division of competence does not distort 
competition, threatening the common agricultural market and thereby endangering 
the principle of Single European Market? This paper discusses some of these issues 
from a political-economy perspective with no pretence of completeness. 
 
European Union, Integration and Institutions: Supranational or National 
Agricultural Policies?  
 
The CAP of the EU represents a concentrated, supranational decision making. In 
general, concentrated, supranational decision making can have advantages, if we 
are able to utilize the gains in efficiency and economies of scale resulting from these 
common, concentrated decisions (Van den Bergh 1996, Widgrén 2003). Efficiency 
gains emerge, if we can create good and effective common rules, standards and 
administrative procedures. However, the key question is that in what kind of 
situations and conditions these potential gains are most likely to be realized. Is the 
European agriculture and agricultural policy such a playing field or an object, as it 
has high diversity between the Member States and their agricultural sectors and Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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rural regions? And what kinds of institutions are most effective in dealing with this 
kind of policy area; should they be concentrated or national and regional? 
 
The starting point for common policies is usually economic integration and its gains. 
International economic integration can be defined, mainly from the point of 
economists specializing in international trade, as a state of affairs or a process 
which involves the amalgamation of separate economies into larger free trade 
regions. In a wider sense, integration simply means the increasing economic 
interdependence between nations. Different forms of economic integration are (El-
Agraa 2001): 
 
•  Free trade areas 
•  Customs unions 
•  Common markets 
•  Complete economic unions: common markets and complete unification of 
monetary and fiscal policies (the EU's aim now); 
•  Complete political unions: one nation, e.g. common parliament and other 
necessary institutions (e.g. the unification of the two Germanies in 1990). 
 
Political integration is often not included in the lists of forms of economic 
integration. For the European integration the political reasons have been clear, 
though. The driving force behind the formation of the EU was the political unity of 
Europe to guarantee peace in the continent. Moreover, the CAP, as one key 
instrument of the integration process in the EU from the very start, has had and 
still has also strong political foundations and reasons, e.g. with regard to recent 
policy reforms, both within the Member States and between the EU, the third 
countries and the international institutions like the WTO (Rieger 1996, Hix 1999). 
At the same time, the CAP represents also the sectoral integration. Sectoral 
integration deals with certain areas (sectors) of the economy, not with the general 
across-the-board integration. We can, however, ask how important this kind of 
sectoral integration is and does it serve the purposes of economic integration as 
such. When mainly related to the free trade areas and customs unions, usual gains 
from economic integration appear in the form of (El-Agraa 2001): 
 
1.  Enhanced efficiency in production by increased specialization (comparative 
advantage) 
2.  Increased production by better exploitation of economies of scale 
3.  An improved international bargaining position 
4.  Enforced changes in efficiency by stronger competition between firms 
5.  Changes affecting both the amount and quality of the factors of production 
due to technological advances, which, in turn, are encouraged by # 4. 
 
An improved international bargaining position (# 3) is one instance where the role 
of supranational decision making is clear for the CAP. Hardly any Member State Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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could have been able to negotiate in the WTO with the same strength as the EU has 
done and will do in the Uruguay and Doha rounds. At the same time, not all 
Member States agree on the EU's stance in the international negotiations to the 
same extent, which has been proved many times in the EU's internal reforms of the 
CAP. On the other hand, it is clear that we do not need CAP as such to take care of 
the agricultural interests of the EU. 
 
As a whole it seems to be that the EU and its decision making are overwhelmingly 
burdened by the CAP: the share of the CAP of all decisions of the EU is still 40 % 
(Alesina et al. 2002) and it still takes about 47 % of the EU budget. Most likely the 
agricultural sectors and issues could be dealt with by more efficient ways than what 
has been the procedure in the CAP of the EU. These more efficient ways could also 
be more targeted and equal, according to the subsidiarity principle of the structural 
funds and regional policy, than what are the procedures of the CAP today. 
 
Concerning the structural funds and regional policy of the EU, they have better 
reasons and goals than the CAP as they contribute positively to the more balanced 
economic development in the EU by helping poorer, remote regions. The CAP often 
does just the opposite, as - according to the notorious rule - 20 % of farmers of the 
best agricultural regions receive 80 % of CAP subsidies. Common regional policy 
serves at least some of the defined purposes of economic integration; the common 
agricultural policy does not. Renationalization should seriously be considered in this 
kind of situation and conditions.  
 
The task of institutions in the international economy is to take care of those 
functions, in which certain countries or regions co-operate or are integrated. In 
addition, institutions act as coordinators; one example of supranational, 
independent institution is the European Central Bank. Widgrén (2003) states that 
if citizens' viewpoints strongly deviate from one country, or region, to another, and 
thus there is high probability to create conflicts between winners and losers, the 
decision making is sensible to retain at the national or regional level. This, among 
other issues, leads him to propose that a considerable part of the CAP should be 
renationalized, provided that national decisions will not create barriers to 
competition in the common markets of the EU.  
 
Hence, the renationalization of one common policy, the CAP, does not threaten one 
important form, i.e. common markets, of economic integration, but it can be 
maintained and further developed by the common rules of the competition and 
trade policies. But the amount of agriculture-specific, Brussels-based double-
bureaucracy could be reduced. Yet, and of course, all the key institutions of the EU 
remain (Commission, Council, Parliament), and their objectives in advancing true 
economic (and political) integration of the Europe could be made much clearer. In 
the following chapters we look at the CAP and its possible renationalization within 
this framework. Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Problems and Challenges of the CAP 
 
The CAP has steadily evolved since its foundation at the Stresa Conference in 1958. 
Attempts at reform have been legion, but not entirely successful. They have not 
improved the efficiency of the CAP nor the friction with the rest of the world (Elliott 
and Heath 2000). The major policy problem is the uneven, non-targeted, 
unconditional and inefficient CAP subsidizing of EU farmers (Baltas 1997, Kola 
1998). Despite ferocious criticism, the core of the policy - highly protected 
commodity prices - was not seriously altered until 1992, when a new support regime 
was introduced. The latest CAP reform agreed on June 2003 makes an attempt to 
create a real radical reform by breaking the basic link between subsidies and 
production – a link which economists see as fundamentally affecting the degree to 
which agricultural policy distorts trade . However, this break is still far from being 
a clear one. “Coupled” support payments are set to continue in many member 
states, particularly in the beef sector, and even where full decoupling is applied, a 
comprehensive armoury of market support measures still remains at the disposal of 
the EU's market actors. 
 
Furthermore, the reform falls short of correcting the major biases in the CAP by 
fixing the current, distorted subsidy system: farmers in the most-favored areas 
continue to receive subsidies that are more than double the amount per hectare 
received in the less favored areas of the current EU-15, e.g. in Finland, Greece, 
Portugal or Spain. Thus, the new support policy will not be more beneficial for the 
less-favored regions of the Union than the current policy, though the CAP reforms 
since 1992 have included also the objective to focus support for farmers’ incomes 




Spending on the CAP has been the main component of the EU budget for many 
years. It still consumes almost half of its entire budget (47 % in 2005) and provides 
the focus for some of the major disagreements among member states and between 
the EU and the rest of the world. Sharply increasing budgetary costs of the CAP 
have often threatened the financial stability of the EU. Contrary to the belief of 
some commentators and policy-makers, pressure to cut CAP spending will not ease 
now that the policy has been overhauled, and the terms of accession for the ten new 
member states have been agreed on. 
 
The agreement on spending levels on the CAP between 2007 and 2013 accepted in 
the Brussels Summit in October 2002 - which paved the way for a breakthrough 
deal on EU enlargement - tied the CAP into a very effective financial straight-
jacket. The agreement allowed the phasing-in of direct aid payments to new 
member states to begin in 2004, but from 2007 spending on the so called first pillar Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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of the CAP (mainly CAP support and financing of the common market 
organisations) is frozen at the 2006 estimated level of € 45.3 billion, plus an annual 
adjustment for inflation of 1 % to 2013. 
 
Table 1: Estimated Budgetary Costs of CAP Reform Proposal Compared with 
Agreed Ceilings (million euros) 
  Budget ceiling  Estimated CAP costs  Margin 
2004  42 769  41 744  1 025 
2005  44 598  43 891  707 
2006  45 502  44 487  655 
2007  45 759  46 176  -417 
2008  46 217  46 330  -113 
2009  46 679  46 970  -291 
2010  47 146  47 566  -420 
2011  47 617  48 182  -565 
2012  48 093  48 798  -705 
2013  48 574  49 414  -840 
Source: Agra Europe 2003b. 
 
 
Figures in Table 1 illustrate the fact that budgetary pressures will continue to 
weigh heavily on CAP decision-making throughout the coming decade. In fact, the 
EU is facing the prospect of applying cuts in the rate of single farm payment aids as 
early as 2007, in order to offset the risk of exceeding the budget ceilings set out at 
the Brussels summit (Agra Europe 2003b, Mayhem 2004). In addition, current cost 
may be further affected by the reform of the sugar regime, which is inevitably 
having a major impact on EU budgetary expenditure. 
 
There is also ambiguity as to whether the ceilings may be adjusted to allow for the 
planned accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. According to the Commission, 
the costs of absorbing the two countries into the EU agricultural policy will amount 
to about €760 million in 2007, rising to €1.65 billion by 2013. Commission says that 
these costs are not included in the budgetary limit for pillar 1 agreed in the 
Brussels 2002 ceiling. Member states determined to hold down EU agricultural 
spending say they must be included. 
 
The impending wrangle over the total level of EU spending in the 2007-13 period 
has put the issue of the size of the agriculture and rural development budget very 
much under the political spotlight. The main element of disagreement is the overall 
level of spending, which the Commission wishes to raise to 1.14% of the EU's gross 
national income (GNI) but which six member states would prefer to be capped at no 
more than 1% of GNI. The campaign by six net contributor countries - the UK, 
France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria - may not be fully 
successful, but will certainly put farm spending of all types under pressure.  Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Not only are factors external to the CAP itself coming to bear, but European 
consumers and taxpayers are asking themselves what they want from the CAP, how 
they want it to be achieved and how much it will cost. The high level study group 
(Sapir et al. 2003) in their examination of EU economic policy arrived at two 
startling conclusions about the CAP. First, spending at the EU level should be 
reduced to one-tenth of its current level. Second, the redistributive functions of the 
CAP should be delegated to member states, in effect a renationalization of farm 
policy. The group contend that the current CAP is a major impediment to the 
achievement of sustainable economic growth, and that it has moved away from a 
policy designed to boost production and economic output, as originally intended, 
towards a policy aimed at social welfare for farmers through a redistribution of 
wealth. Such distributive tasks would be better managed at the national levels. The 
case for a common social policy is, hence, weak (Padoa-Schioppa, 1987). 
 
An important aspect of the financial flows of the CAP to deserve special mentioning 
is the relationship they have created between national interest and the expansion of 
domestic agriculture. It is well known that whilst every government may accept 
that aggregate production and aggregate expenditure of the CAP should be cut, it 
will not wish to cut its own production or to reduce its own receipts (Harvey 1982). 
Member states know that the more they produce internally the more they 
internalize the financial flows of the CAP, reducing their purchases from other 
Member states and their net contributions to the budget. If, indeed, they have 
overstepped the self-sufficiency mark and reached a point of becoming exporters, 
then the CAP ensures that they bear the cost of disposing of the excess only in 
proportion to their incremental contribution to the budget (Marsh 1984). 
 
Furthermore, the CAP support has also affected the inter-sectoral flows within 
Member States differently than would have been the case under purely national 
policies. This aspect also deserves mention, since an appropriate level of 
intersectoral transfers is likely to be perceived very differently within Member 
States (Rabinowicz et al. 2001). In subjective terms, it is clear that the political 
weight of agriculture varies within Member Countries. In more objective terms, 
countries are different regarding the real income per caput, the relative income of 
the agricultural and other sectors of the economy and the regional distribution of 
income and employment opportunities. Thus if the problem is one of equity, 
different rules would be required in different countries (Marsh 1984).  
 
Structures and Income 
 
The CAP was initially designed for a Community that was small and quite 
homogeneous, i.e. for the six founding Member States of the EU. Now there are 25 
Member States, soon to be 27. There are great differences between the agricultural 
sectors of the old 15 Member States. These differences have become much more Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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striking with the accession of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs). There is a huge variation between Member States for example in 
terms of natural and climatic conditions, farm structure, productivity and 
profitability, allocation and levels of CAP support, and the overall significance of 
agriculture to rural regions and national economies, and the significance of rural, 
mainly agricultural, regions to society and economy at large.  
 
In 2000, the average farm size was only 5 ha in Greece but more than 70 ha in the 
UK (EU-15, 20 ha). The average dairy herd size ranged between 9 and 18 cows in 
Portugal, Greece, Austria, Spain and Finland but was 65 in Denmark and 72 in the 
UK (EU-15, 26 cows). Agriculture employed 17 per cent of the labor force in Greece, 
13 per cent in Portugal but only 2 to 3 per cent in Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (EU-15, 4.3 per cent). The growing season is 
about 140 days in Finland but over 300 days in many Member States. Diversity is 
often regarded as the richness and advantage of the EU, but at the same time one 
should ask whether it is possible, or sensible, to have a common agricultural policy 
in the EU especially as it has become even more diverse after the enlargement.  
 
Inequalities of development among member states and differences in production 
orientations mean that some states benefit more than others from the European 
farm policy. The budget balance thus differs from one state to another, some being 
net beneficiaries and others net contributors. In agricultural aid, the major cereal 
producing and cattle rearing countries are the main beneficiaries (France, Germany 
and Italy). Structural funds are awarded mainly to regions that are behind in 
development: Spain, the Eastern Germany, Italy, Greece and Portugal. The strict 
budgetary discipline decided in the Brussels summit in October 2002 has led to 
increased criticism concerning the unequal distribution of agricultural expenditure 
between the different sectors. The Mediterranean countries, in particular, have 
been demanding more balanced resource allocation between the so-called northern 
products (arable crops, milk, beef) and southern products (fruits and vegetables, 
olive oil, wine, tobacco). Currently, arable crops account for about 45 % of the 
budget funds of the CAP.  
 
Because the CAP rewards high yields, farmers in the most-favored areas receive 
more than double the amount per hectare in CAP arable payments compared to 
farmers in the less favored areas of Finland and Portugal. Moreover, as there are no 
support ceilings or thresholds in the CAP, many big farms receive hundreds of 
thousands of euros of taxpayers' money (Kola 2002). Thus big farms, and big 
exporters, farms in Denmark and the UK receive on average more than €18,000 per 
farm from the Guarantee section. In contrast farms in the less-favored agricultural 
areas of the Southern Member States receive in the range of €1,600-4,100 per farm, 
the EU average being about €5,700. The most recent member states with arctic and 
alpine conditions, Finland and Austria, do not do very well either.  
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The current CAP is just not capable of meeting the needs of the member states. In 
order to secure continuation of agriculture in the least-favored regions of the EU, 
some Member States have been forced to use considerable amounts of national 
funds, with the permission of the EU, to offset the inadequacies of the CAP. In 
Finland, for example, the share of national funds in total farm support is 56 per 
cent, and special northern aids are fully financed by the national government, again 
with the permission of the EU (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2005). In the Finnish view the 
agricultural policy of the EU should contain more elements through which the 
differences in the competitiveness due to the natural conditions could be better 
taken into account. Now most of the EU support compensates for the decrease in 
the institutional prices since 1992, which means that farmers in the best 
agricultural regions get the highest support. 
 
The less-favored areas (LFA) support does not change this picture very much at all 
as this aid is also allocated to all Member States. The traditional forms of support in 
the EAGGF Guarantee section still account for 90 per cent of the EU’s total 
agricultural budget, and they are the basis for the future farm subsidies according 
to the latest CAP reform. It is therefore clear that the CAP measures have not 
mitigated and will not mitigate regional differences to a sufficient extent, i.e. the 
CAP is not common enough (Baltas 1997). If support per hectare were the same 
throughout the EU we would have a much more common and fair policy. Moreover, 
the EU could make much needed savings with a common rate set clearly below the 
current top levels. 
 
The single farm payment of the latest CAP reform is innovative to some extent, but 
the new support policy will not be more beneficial for the less-favored regions of the 
Union than the current policy. Instead, the reform will consolidate the present 
distribution of support payments, which from the perspective of less-favored regions 
is distorted and unjust, as the payments would be based on the support levels of the 
previous years. Furthermore, the decrease in the producer prices and decoupling of 
payments is ill suited to the adverse conditions, where the variable costs of the 
production are often higher than the market return. The more favourable 
production regions in Central Europe are not faced with this problem, because there 




New approaches and means for rural policy in association of the CAP are evidently, 
and quite urgently, needed. Since almost two decades in the EU, attempts have 
been made to integrate agricultural structural policy into the wider economic and 
social context of rural areas - without major success. Sufficiently concrete policy 
measures are to a large extent still missing (Shucksmith et al. 2005). In terms of 
the efficiency and sensibility of policy, special care should be taken that the 
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objectives creates true benefits, rather than just making the policy more costly and 
bureaucratic (Day 1998, Buckwell et al. 1997). It is clear that agriculture alone 
cannot maintain rural livelihood, but it can - today and in the future - contribute to 
rural livelihood also through its traditional goal, i.e. via helping to maintain 
economic viability of the agricultural sector (Kola 1998, Shucksmith et al. 2005). 
 
Where agricultural measures are concerned, there has been a gradual shift from 
measures directed at productivity growth towards measures emphasizing the 
multifunctional role of the agricultural sector – a key concept in the EU today 
(Terluin 2001). The logic of remunerating the multifunctional role of agriculture 
calls for better consideration of factors like the rural territory, the environment, the 
landscape, rural communities and rural employment. Government assistance will 
be granted only in return for clearly defined services on the part of farmers. 
 
Yet, the allocation of CAP spending does not advance multifunctionality very much 
at all. By pursuing the CAP with the current instruments the Commission therefore 
undermines its own goal, a goal which it is strongly advocating in the World Trade 
Organization. This new goal requires a revised allocation and new types of support 
to enhance multifunctionality throughout the EU. Although, arguably, this is not a 
rational goal in purely economic or budgetary terms it is, nevertheless, a widely 
accepted common decision. EU policies should advance it, not hinder it (Kola 2002). 
 
With regard to the measures aimed at the more general development of rural 
economies, we have seen a shift from measures encouraging inward investments 
towards measures enhancing the local development potential. In governance an 
emerging shift from top-down to bottom-up can be perceived (Day 1998). The 
politicians will be forced to take account of the objectives supported by voters. 
Objectives such as preventing rural depopulation, maintaining the appearance of 
the countryside, and ensuring that farming is carried in an environmentally 
friendly manner require a closer integration of agriculture in a comprehensive rural 
policy (Gant 1995). Therefore, it seems clear that the EU agricultural policy will in 
future be defined in decreasingly sectoral but increasingly territorial terms (Vihinen 
2001).  
 
Given the differences in rural problems between member states, many of these 
objectives can be tackled more efficiently at a national level within the context of 
partnership between the Union and the member states (Gant 1995). The 
importance of the national level can, for example, be illustrated by the fact that 
central governments are the most important distributors of resources for public 
infrastructure, social security, education etc. (Keating 1999). In addition macro-
economic policy for ensuring economic stability is also implemented at the national 
level. 
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Giving the CAP a more territorial and even a regional content will make it easier to 
be financed, since measures of this kind are normally co-financed, in distinction to 
price and market regimes, which are financed totally from the EU budget. This 
change would prepare the ground for more national influence on social and 
environmental measures, implying an implicit renationalization of the CAP.  
 
It would seem fair to say that for European taxpayers it would be better, both for 
economic and equity reasons, if the CAP and other policy supports were more 
clearly allocated and targeted to the most important objectives and to those most in 
need (Vaubel 1994, Gant 1995). The CAP must serve more clearly and efficiently 
the new and more consumer, environment and rural-oriented objectives of the 
entire EU (Shucksmith et al. 2005). Paying the highest subsidy to farms with the 
most productive land, or to an industrialized large-scale livestock unit in the most 
intensive farming systems cannot be the direction desired by European citizens. 
Proper multifunctionality support, the equalization of support per hectare and 
support ceilings per farm, together, would contribute to greater policy efficiency and 
effectiveness (Kola 2002). 
 
Supporters of a switch in emphasis in the operation of the EU's rural and 
agricultural policies from production support to rural development had hoped that 
the new regime ushered in by the 2003 CAP reform would lead to much more money 
being switched out of market support into the payments “based on public goods and 
services.” But the outlook for the budget would suggest that this is not likely to be 
so. Under the Commission's proposals for the 2007-13 period an average annual 
amount of around €43 billion is allocated to agricultural markets, while a mere €11 
to 12 billion on average is set aside for agricultural/rural structural schemes (Agra 
Europe 2005). 
 
Thus the total possible expenditure on rural development in the new budgetary 
period, €97.15 billion is only 28% of the massive sum of €344.8 billion to be spent on 
direct subsidies and market support during the same period. All of this sum could 
be easily absorbed in the badly needed restructuring of the 10 mainland European 
new member states (i.e. including Bulgaria and Romania). Therefore, a serious 
thought should be given in the upcoming budget negotiations to the possibility of 
switching much more of the total €433.6 billion to be spent in the period from 2007 
to 2013 from support of farms and farming into the wider economic development of 
rural areas. 
 
Institutional Factors and Governance Methods 
 
Over the decades, the CAP as a whole has become very complex and bureaucratic, 
and some of its methods of governance rather obsolete. The decision-making process 
of the CAP is itself rather complicated. The central decisions concerning the course 
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Commission. It is difficult to deny that the complicated structure of the CAP makes 
clear and easily understandable political decisions difficult (Schmitt 1986). In 
particular, it does seem fair to say that the decision-making process of the CAP has 
not been able to respond adequately to the national and regional or local needs and 
priorities. Neither the 1992 reform nor the Agenda 2000 reform has eased the 
situation. However, policy reforms can be expected to be successful only if 
implemented in conjunction with the restructuring of the methods of governance. 
 
The model of CAP governance was initially conceived for a Community that was 
small and quite homogeneous. Therefore, the enlargement in May 2004 is bound to 
challenge the governance of the CAP in two major respects: it has very significantly 
increased the diversity of preferences and needs; and it has increased by two thirds 
the number of governments participating in the Council, thereby putting additional 
demands on already strained decision-making procedures (Sapir 2003). Differences 
arise, for example, in capacities to deliver shared rules. This is apparent in areas 
such as environmental protection, product safety, or some elements of which are 
currently centralized in the name of the Single Market. Similarly, the difficulty of 
enforcing common disciplines for state aids is going to increase. Hence, the trade-off 
between efficiency and preference heterogeneity is bound to become more acute 
(Tabellini 2003). 
 
The standard EU response to heterogeneity is to leave the ‘acquis communautaire’ 
untouched while making room for long transition periods. This traditional response 
– less regulation, more co-ordination and commitment – is likely to conflict with the 
alternative response of advocating more streamlined, simplified decision-taking 
procedures, since the move to income support in lieu of price support combined with 
increased diversity as a consequence of enlargement weakens the rationale for 
retaining EU competence in agriculture (Padoa-Schioppa 1987, Sapir et. 2003). 
Efficient income distribution, for example, requires detailed administration at the 
level of the individual, and coherence with features of income tax and social security 
systems, and Community cannot assure this. 
 
Moving policies back from the EU institutions to the national level is politically very 
sensitive, however. Advocates of the traditional approach suggest that increasing 
Member States’ influence could turn out to be a dangerous path unless the EU 
institutions are given sufficient powers to ensure that basic principles of the CAP 
are not put at risk. Supporters of the gradual renationalization, however, believe in 
a streamlined, political Commission with fewer managerial functions, and the 
creation of a raft of semi-autonomous bodies to deal with the finer details of day-to-
day policymaking. In fact, the high level study group (Sapir et al. 2003) suggests 
spelling out more precisely the scope of policies and rules that must apply to all 
Member States and the procedures for making decisions in cases where not all are 
required to participate. 
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Renationalization of the CAP – A Way Forward? 
 
The problems and challenges of the CAP discussed in the previous section and the 
latest enlargement have important implications for how to reform the CAP policies 
and institutions. In the following, it will be discussed if a renationalization of the 
CAP would be an applicable way to proceed in an attempt to pursue a policy 
sensitive enough to national and regional or local needs and priorities. 
Renationalization can be understood as a propensity to reinforce the power of the 
Member States in CAP matters at the expense of the Community decision-making 
process. In other words, the prerogatives put forward by the CAP should revert back 
to the Member States, and that this would be confirmed by a change of the 
Community law in this direction (Bublot 1984, Rabinowicz et al. 2001). 
 
Renationalization of the CAP is not a new feature, however. Over the last couple of 
decades, certain elements central to the CAP have involved a considerable degree of 
nationalization (Kjeldahl and Tracy 1994). Hints at the renationalization of at least 
some aspects of the CAP have also emerged from the recent reform debate. This is 
illustrated most vividly by the agreement to allow up to 10% of each member state's 
overall national aid entitlements to be spent on special “additional payments … for 
the purposes of encouraging specific types of farming”. Member states themselves 
would draw up a list of the "specific problem areas" involved. In addition, Member 
States have been given leeway to choose full of partial decoupling of direct aid 
payments. Where the Agenda 2000 created the notion of “financial envelopes” 
offering a choice of cash top-ups on existing aid payments, this new innovation 
amounts to the creation of “policy envelopes” (Agra Europe 2003a). Member States 
may also pay the single farm payment at a flat-rate regional level, and may set 
separate aid rates in each region for permanent pasture and for cropland.  
 
In effect, member states are being invited to write their own farm support policies 
as a supplement to (and partial replacement for) existing aid schemes. For CAP 
traditionalists, this represents an alarming development – even though the relative 
share-out of total CAP funds between member states will be rigidly maintained at 
the current levels (Agra Europe 2003a). Although Commission officials scoff at any 
notion of renationalizing the CAP, accusations are already being leveled against the 
Commission that it is now presiding over a “renationalization” of the CAP, in the 
flexibility it has shown member states. 
 
Increasing Member States’ influence in some policy areas could also be justified by 
the principle of subsidiarity (European Commission 1999). The Accession Treaty of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden already includes some measures that are of a mainly 
national nature. Finland, in particular, has emphasized many country-specific 
characteristics and disadvantages, primarily the northern location, that should be 
taken care of by the CAP means. Since the existent CAP means are insufficient and Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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inapplicable, the EU has not been willing to pay for Finland-specific measures. The 
financial responsibility of the northern support measures have been left entirely on 
Finland (Kola 1996). As a result, the share of national funds in total farms support 
in Finland is 56 per cent. Yet, also the nationally financed programs have to be 
accepted by the EU Commission. 
 
With the accession of the ten candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEECs) in May 2004, the pressure for increased financial participation by Member 
States is reinforced. There may be unforeseen expenses also in sectors other than 
agriculture. Considering the already very tight budgetary discipline, this will 
inevitably lead to an increase in the national contributions to the financing of 
measures in the agricultural sector. A point has been made also in a Commission 
report which discusses the possibility for Member States to shoulder a larger share 
of the financing of direct aids (European Commission 1998). 
 
Furthermore, the financing of program-based support payments on the basis of 
contracts with farms differentiates the support schemes to the extent that a 
common financial interest may be increasingly difficult to find. The shift of the focus 
away from the basic agriculture means that the measures and their criteria would 
be designed on the basis of the special needs of different countries and regions. The 
detailed contents of the support measures would no longer be harmonized at the EU 
level, but the common policies would lay down only the general framework and 
maximum compensations. This procedure is already being followed for the part of 
the environmental support schemes, where the measures, extent and compensations 
vary considerably (Aakkula 2003).  
 
Increasing national financial responsibility would also lead to a necessary change in 
the system of political and economic incentives to Member Country governments 
which results from the CAP. In the current institutional framework, the Member 
States have an incentive to violate the Community’s interest by stimulating 
domestic agriculture, leading to increased divergences in national interests with 
respect to common price and support decisions. The system of financial solidarity 
implies that any price and support change induces visible and invisible transfers 
among Member States. Therefore, it is understandable that individual countries 
aim at maximizing the changes in their received net transfers. From all this it 
follows that the institutional arrangements of the CAP create a bias in favour of the 
agricultural industry among the political agents (Whetstone 2000). If the 
agricultural policy were decided at the national level, this would not happen to the 
same extent. 
 
Naturally, questions arise of how market unity, a fundamental principle of the CAP, 
may comply with steps towards more national influence. Market unity has hitherto 
been applied by imposing common support measures, including protection against 
imports from third countries, while removing obstacles within the Community. Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Emerging protectionism in the Member States, expressed as generous national 
support, would constitute a threat to this principle (Bublot 1984). In other words, 
renationalization should not pave the way for governments to give unlimited 
national aids to their agricultural sectors. If market unity should be conserved 
along with a more nationally-oriented policy, it would be essential that the 
Commission should be able to survey – and enforce – that national assistance 
targeting environmental or social objectives do not give rise to unfair competition 
(Kjeldahl and Tracy 1994).  
 
It is, therefore, expedient to remember that national policy should be in conformity 
with the EU’s constitutional principles, including the EU competition policy and the 
principle of Single European Market. Primary responsibility for implementation of 
social, income, regional or structural policies could be left on member states, 
whereas it would be important to have common framework for agro-environmental 
issues as well as production ethics and veterinary and phytosanitary aspects of 
agricultural production and food products in the EU (Kola 1996). National measures 





The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU does not currently meet the 
different needs of diverse agricultural conditions of different member countries in a 
just and equal way. To meet this challenge has become inevitably more difficult as 
new and diverse Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have entered 
the Community. Several commentators and economists have thus suggested that a 
renationalization of the CAP would be an applicable way to proceed in an attempt to 
pursue a policy sensitive enough to national and regional or local needs and 
priorities. Renationalization implies a shift of competence back from EU 
institutions to national ones. For CAP traditionalists, this represents an alarming 
development, however. 
 
The key question in the framework of economic integration is that in what 
dimension the Common Agricultural Policy is better than a renationalized policy. 
This paper shows that the EU does not need the CAP as such to promote the 
economic integration and balanced development of the Member States. In fact, in 
some instances the CAP eventually prevents the EU from achieving these general 
goals. Common markets can be guaranteed by the common competition and trade 
policies. The EU budget allocations can be directed to the objectives and functions 
that are much more efficient than the CAP in enhancing the economic integration 
and balanced development of the Union, especially in association of the 
enlargement. Renationalization would remove a remarkable share of the 
agriculture-specific, Brussels-based double-bureaucracy. It would also release the 
decision making bodies to concentrate on true integration of Europe, instead of Niemi and Kola / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  38
devoting a big share of their time and resources to so-called sectoral integration in 
the form of the CAP. 
 
One of the major drawbacks of the renationalization would be related to the new 
member countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of the CEECs cannot afford 
on allocating same kind of resources to their agricultural sectors as what could be 
the case in the current Member States. Hence, this may generate economic and 
market distortions and political tensions. However, they could be avoided by a more 
targeted and efficient use of the EU's structural funds and regional policy, which 
can be regarded as sensible common policies in the framework of economic 
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